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Abstract We study the one-way flow model of network formation with owner-
homogeneous link costs and heterogeneous profits. Recently, several proofs of
existence of Nash networks are discussed in literature. The proof by Billand et al.
(Econ Theory, 2007, forthcoming) is based on a nice and clear idea, but the technical
elaboration is tedious and too complex in our opinion. In this note, we provide an
alternative and easy accessible proof based on the same idea. Also, we show by means
of a counterexample that Nash networks may not exist for games where link costs are
heterogeneous, but arbitrarily close to owner-homogeneity.
Keywords Network formation · Non-cooperative games
JEL Classification C72 · D85
1 Introduction
Bala and Goyal (2000) introduce a non-cooperative game model of network formation.
Agents, who correspond to the nodes of the network, are able to form links unilaterally,
i.e. without consent of other agents. Agents receive profits from being connected
to other agents. However, links are expensive. Two variants are being studied by
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Bala and Goyal (2000): the one-way flow model and the two-way flow model. Profits
flow along the direction of the arcs in the one-way flow model, while they flow along
both directions of the arcs in the two-way flow model. In this note, we study the one-
way flow model. The two-way flow model has been studied by Galeotti et al. (2006),
Haller and Sarangi (2005), and Haller et al. (2007).
For the one-way flow model, the architecture of Nash networks has been addressed
by Bala and Goyal (2000) and Galeotti (2006). Bala and Goyal (2000) prove the
existence of Nash networks when link costs and profits are homogeneous, i.e. all
links are equally expensive, and each agent receives a constant profit value for being
connected to each other agent.
The existence of Nash networks in one-way flow models for owner-homogeneous
link costs, i.e. all links are equally expensive with respect to the owner, and hetero-
geneous profits has been proved by Billand et al. (2007) and independently by Derks
et al. (2008a). These two proofs are totally different from each other. The latter is a
proof by induction; to show that a Nash network exists for a game with n agents, Derks
et al. (2008a) used the induction hypothesis that a Nash network exists for each game
with less than n agents. Billand et al. (2007) provide a constructive proof, in which
a sequence of networks is constructed where each successive network is as least as
good for each agent. The idea behind their approach is very nice and clear. However,
its implementation is complicated and too technical in our opinion. Therefore, we
provide an alternative proof in this note, that is directly based on the same idea.
Furthermore, Billand et al. (2007) provide conditions for the existence of Nash
networks when link costs are heterogeneous. According to these conditions, Nash
networks exist when the difference between any two link costs is smaller than the
constant profit value. In this note, we show by means of a counterexample that this
result is not correct. For this counterexample, where link costs are arbitrarily close to
the situation of owner-homogeneity, we show that Nash networks do not exist.
A different approach to study the existence of Nash networks is used by Derks
et al. (2008b). They model network formation as a dynamic game in which agents
play local actions, which are adding, removing or replacing a link. Furthermore, they
study payoff functions that fulfill a specified framework of properties. By a series of
improving local actions, they prove the existence of local-Nash networks, which are
global-Nash as well.
2 Model and notations
Let N = {1, . . . , n} denote a finite set of agents. We define a one-way flow network
g on the agent set N as a set of links g ⊆ N × N , where loops are not allowed, i.e.
(i, i) ∈ g for all i ∈ N .
We say that a link ( j, i), which is directed to i , is owned by i . Let g−i denote the
network obtained from g after removing the links owned by i .
A directed path from j to i in g is a sequence of distinct agents i1, i2, . . . , ik with,
k ≥ 1, such that j = i1, i = ik and (is, is+1) ∈ g for each s = 1, 2, . . . , k − 1.
An undirected path is defined analogously, but here, either (is, is+1) or (is+1, is) is
contained in g for each s = 1, 2, . . . , k − 1.
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Let Car(g), the carrier of network g, be the set of agents who are begin- or endpoints
in g. For a network g we define g j , the component of g that contains agent j , as the
network containing all links that are connected to j by some undirected path. Since g j
may be empty, which is the case when j is isolated in g, we assume that j is contained
in the carrier of g j , i.e. let j ∈ Car(g j ).
Let Ni (g) = { j ∈ N : a directed path from j to i exists in g}. We will refer to the
agents in this set as observed agents by agent i in network g. Let N di (g)={ j : ( j, i)∈g}.
Note that i ∈ Ni (g), and i ∈ N di (g).
For each agent i , let πi : G → R be a payoff function, where G is the set of all
possible one-way flow networks. We will use the following payoff function, which







ci j . (1)
Here, vi j is the profit that agent i receives from being connected to j and ci j is the
cost of link ( j, i) for agent i . Thus, agent i pays for each own link, i.e., for each link
ending at i , and he receives profits from being connected to each other agent j , which
is the case when a directed path from j to i exists.
We say that link costs are homogeneous if there is a constant c with ci j = c for all
i, j ∈ N . Link costs are owner-homogeneous if for each agent i there is a constant
ci with ci j = ci for all j ∈ N . Otherwise, the link costs are heterogeneous. These
definitions also apply to the profits. The profits and link costs are assumed to be
non-negative throughout this paper.
In this paper we study a non-cooperative game. This game is played by the agents
in N . Simultaneously and independently, each agent i chooses a, possibly empty, set S
of agents he wants to connect to by creating the links ( j, i), for each j ∈ S. Together,
the links of all agents form a network g ∈ G. Then, each agent i receives a payoff
πi (g).
We define an action of agent i to a network g by a set of agents S ⊆ N \ {i}. The
network, after i chooses to link up with the agents in S, is described by
g−i ∪ {( j, i) : j ∈ S}.
An action S∗ of agent i is called a best response if
πi
(
g−i ∪ {( j, i) : j ∈ S∗}
) ≥ πi (g−i ∪ {( j, i) : j ∈ S})
for all actions S ⊆ N \ {i}. A network g is a Nash network if N di (g) is a best response
for all i ∈ N , i.e., if for each agent i
πi (g) ≥ πi (g−i ∪ {( j, i) : j ∈ S})
for all actions S ⊆ N \ {i}.
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Let g−i j = g j−i ∪ {( j, i)}. Recall that g−i is network g where all i’s links are
removed, so that g j−i is the component of g−i where j is contained in its carrier. It is
immediate that
πi (g) ≤ πi (g \ {( j, i)}) + πi (g−i j ), (2)
when link ( j, i) is contained in g. Therefore, when agent i plays a best response then
πi (g−i j ) ≥ 0 for each j ∈ N di (g). We say that link ( j, i) is beneficial in g when
πi (g−i j ) ≥ 0, and a network g is called beneficial when all its links are beneficial.
Observe that a Nash network is beneficial.
3 Non-existence of Nash networks
Billand et al. (2007) claim that Nash networks always exist if for all i, j, j ′ ∈ N holds
that |ci j − ci j ′ | < vi (see their Proposition 3). This is not true due to the following
example.
Example 1 (Derks et al. 2008a) Let n = 4 and call the agents 1, 2, 3 and 4. Let π be
a payoff function defined by (1), where link costs are heterogeneous and profits are
homogeneous and normalized to 1. The numbers next to the links in Fig. 1 indicate
the costs of these links. Here,  is a strictly positive number which can be chosen
arbitrarily close to 0. The costs of the links that are not depicted in this figure are the
following:
− links owned by agent 1 have costs 1 + ,
− links owned by agent 2 have costs 2 + ,
− links owned by agents 3 and 4 have costs 3 + ,
Notice that since vi i = 1, πi (g−i ) = 1 for any network g and any agent i .
The best response of agent 4 to any network is either {2} or ∅, since those are the
only actions for which agent 4 might have a payoff of at least 1. First, suppose that
agent 4 plays {2} as a best response in a Nash network. Consequently, the unique best
response of agent 1 is {4}. Agent 2 has one unique best response to this situation: {1}.
Finally, agent 3 has one unique best response, which is {2}. The obtained network
is the same as depicted in Fig. 1. It follows that {2} is not a best response of agent
4, since ∅ gives a higher payoff. This contradicts our assumption. Hence, there is no
Nash network in which agent 4 plays {2}.
Fig. 1 The link costs
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Fig. 2 Network obtained in
Example 1
Now suppose that agent 4 plays ∅ as a best response in a Nash network. Agent 1
will include 4 in every best response to this situation. Then, the unique best response
for agent 2 is {1}. To this situation, the unique best response of agent 3 is {2}. Hence,
the unique best response of agent 1 is {3, 4} (see Fig. 2). Now agent 4 has a unique
best response to this new situation, which is {2}. This contradicts our assumption of
agent 4 playing ∅ in a Nash network. Hence no Nash networks exist.
For this example, link costs are close to owner-homogeneity, i.e. |ci j − ci j ′ | ≤ 2
for all i, j, j ′ ∈ N . Since vi j = 1 for all i, j ∈ N , and since  can be chosen arbitrarily
small to 0, we have |ci j − ci j ′ | < 1. Therefore this example is a counterexample for
Proposition 3 by Billand et al. (2007).
4 Existence of Nash networks
In this section, we prove the existence of Nash networks for games with owner-
homogeneous link costs, i.e. ci j = ci for all i, j ∈ N .
Let a network be proper if the outdegree of each agent is at most 1. In a proper
network g, an agent i observes each agent j ∈ Ni (g) via a unique directed path, and
by this observation it is not hard to see that equality holds in (2), whenever g is proper.
For any network g let C(g) denote the set of agents located on a directed cycle in
g. Further, let D(g) denote the set of agents who observe at least one agent in C(g),
i.e. D(g) = {i : Ni (g) ∩ C(g) = ∅}.
Assuming that the agents are numbered 1, 2, . . . , n there is a unique ordering
s1, s2, . . . , sd of agents in D(g), with sk < sk+1 for each k = 1, 2, . . . , d = |D(g)|.
Consider the following network gˆ, defined by gˆ = g in case d = 0, and for d ≥ 2
(notice that d = 1 does not exist, since a cycle contains at least two agents):
gˆ = {(s1, s2), . . . , (sd−1, sd), (sd , s1)} ∪ {( j, i) ∈ g : j ∈ D(g)}.
An example of this network is depicted in Fig. 3.
Lemma 1 If for a network g the agents outside D(g) have at most one outgoing link
then gˆ is proper.
Proof Each agent in D(g) has exactly one outgoing link in gˆ, namely the one on the
cycle. Each agent outside D(g) has the same outdegree in gˆ as in g. unionsq
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Fig. 3 Network g with the corresponding network gˆ
Observe that g = gˆ whenever D(g) = ∅, i.e. whenever there are no cycles in g.
Otherwise, gˆ has exactly one cycle. Notice also that an agent has no more links in gˆ
than in g, so that in the owner-homogeneous costs situation the agents in gˆ face costs
at most as in g. Furthermore, the agents observe the same or more agents in gˆ:
Lemma 2 Ni (g) ⊆ Ni (gˆ) for each agent i .
Proof Let j ∈ Ni (g). Suppose i ∈ D(g), then any directed path from j to i in g does
not visit an agent in D(g), and therefore it is also a directed path in gˆ. This implies
that i observes j in gˆ: j ∈ Ni (gˆ).
Now suppose i ∈ D(g). When also j ∈ D(g) then i observes j via the cycle in gˆ.
So, let j ∈ D(g), and let k be the first agent in D(g) on a directed path from j to i
in g. Then, the subpath from j to k is also a directed path in gˆ, implying j ∈ Nk(gˆ).
Since k ∈ Ni (gˆ), we must have j ∈ Ni (gˆ). unionsq
Lemma 3 Let the payoff function be given by (1) where link costs are owner-
homogeneous, i.e. ci j = ci for all i, j ∈ N. If a network g is beneficial, then net-
work gˆ is also beneficial.
Proof Let ( j, i) ∈ gˆ. We prove that ( j, i) is beneficial in gˆ.
Suppose j ∈ D(g). This implies ( j, i) ∈ g. For k ∈ Ni (g−i j ) there is a directed
path from k to i via link ( j, i) in g, and none of the visited agents are members of D(g)
(except possibly i), so that this path is also present in gˆ−i j . This implies k ∈ Ni (gˆ−i j ),
and therefore,
πi (gˆ−i j ) =
∑
k∈Ni (gˆ−i j )
vik − ci ≥
∑
k∈Ni (g−i j )
vik − ci = πi (g−i j ).
Beneficiality of link ( j, i) in g implies therefore the beneficiality of ( j, i) in gˆ.
Now, suppose j ∈ D(g). Then the link ( j, i) is a link of the cycle of gˆ. It is evident
that D(g) ⊆ Ni (gˆ−i j ). Also, D(g) ∩ N di (g) = ∅, say k ∈ D(g) ∩ N di (g). We know
that (k, i) is beneficial in g. Since link costs are owner-homogeneous, i.e. cik = ci j ,
we conclude that link ( j, i) is beneficial in gˆ whenever
Ni (g−ik) ⊆ Ni (gˆ−i j ). (3)
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So, let r ∈ Ni (g−ik). If r ∈ D(g) then also r ∈ Ni (gˆ−i j ) as we mentioned before.
Thus, assume r ∈ D(g). There is a directed path from r to k in g−i . Let r ′ be the first
agent from D(g) on this path. Then the subpath from r to r ′ is present in gˆ. Extend
this path with the directed path from r ′ to j on the cycle of gˆ, thus obtaining a directed
path from r to j in gˆ. This path does not visit agent i since i is not on the path from
r to r ′, and also i is not located on the cycle between r ′ and j since i is found on the
cycle right after agent j . Hence, r ∈ Ni (gˆ−i j ), implying (3). Hence we conclude that
( j, i) is beneficial in gˆ. unionsq
Proposition 1 Let the payoff function be given by (1) where link costs are owner-
homogeneous, i.e. ci j = ci for all i, j ∈ N. Then a Nash network always exists.
Proof Consider the following sequence of networks:
Step 0: Let t = 1, and gt = ∅;
Step 1: If gt is Nash then STOP.
Step 2: Let agent i perform a best answer in gt , with as many links as possible, and
let gt+1 be the resulting network;
Step 3: Let gt+2 = gˆt+1;
Step 4: Let t = t + 2, and return to Step 1.
(For convenience we write gˆt+1 instead of ĝt+1.)
Let i be an agent who applies a best response B to gt with as many links as
possible, obtaining gt+1. Suppose that gt is proper and beneficial. We prove that (i)
Ni (gt+1) ⊃ Ni (gt ), (ii) gˆt+1 is beneficial, and (iii) gˆt+1 is proper.
(i) Let j ∈ N di (gt ), and suppose j ∈ B. Since gt is proper it follows that agent j
in (gt ) j−i is the unique agent who observes all agents in (gt )
j



















∩ B = ∅, then j ∈ B.






∩ B = ∅, so that




= πi (gt+1) + πi
(
(gt )−i j
) ≥ πi (gt+1).
The latter inequality is due to the beneficiality of the links in gt . Since the best
response B is chosen as large as possible, and the action B ∪ { j} is at least as
good as B, we arrive at a contradiction. Hence,
N di (gt ) ⊆ B. (4)
Since B is a strict improvement, we have N di (gt ) ⊂ B, implying Ni (gt+1) ⊃
Ni (gt ).
(ii) By (4) it follows that gt ⊆ gt+1, and this proves the beneficiality of the links
( j, i) ∈ gt in gt+1. As for the added links ( j, i), with j ∈ B\N di (gt ) we observed
already (see (2)) that these links are beneficial in gt+1. So, gt+1 is beneficial,
and because of Lemma 3, we conclude that gˆt+1 is beneficial.
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(iii) To show that gˆt+1 is proper, by Lemma 1 we only need to check the
outdegrees of the agents outside D(gt+1) in gt+1. Furthermore, only the outde-
gree of the agents in B\N di (gt ) are raised by 1, with respect to the outdegree
in the proper network gt . Therefore, we only need to check that the agents in
B\ (N di (gt ) ∪ D(gt+1)
)
have outdegree 0 in gt .
Consider an agent j ∈ B\N di (gt ), and suppose that his outdegree in gt is 1.
Then it is easily checked that j is necessarily located on the cycle of gt , i.e.
j ∈ D(gt ). Observe that D(gt ) is a subset of D(gt+1), so that we conclude
that j ∈ B\ (N di (gt ) ∪ D(gt+1)
)
. Hence, all agents in B\ (N di (gt ) ∪ D(gt+1)
)
have outdegree 0 in gt .
Observe that we started with a beneficial, proper network. By Lemma 2 and part
(i) we conclude that the total number of observed agents of the constructed networks
does not decrease, and strictly increases when Step 2 is performed. The procedure has
therefore to terminate with a network that is Nash. Observe that this network is also
beneficial and proper. unionsq
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